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This paper examines the historical record of “urban triage,” a controversial 
planning policy that called for the rehabilitation of areas in the early stages of decline 
over those in greater need, with the goal of stabilizing the greatest part of the city with the 
least resources.  Similar policies are being proposed today in response to enduring 
population loss and fiscal crisis in cities like Youngstown, Flint, and Detroit, but few 
contemporary planners are aware of the previous cases or the body of planning literature 
that arose in response to them.   Using planning records, newspaper accounts, and 
interviews with planners involved in the cases, this paper first defines urban triage, 
situating the policy as a response to a deepening fiscal and urban crisis, cutbacks in 
federal aid, and the transition from categorical federal grants to block grants.  It then 
analyzes the challenges planners faced, practically and politically, in their efforts to turn 
urban triage into policy in St. Louis and Cleveland.  It argues that urban triage was 
distinct from policies of urban renewal or planned shrinkage and could be justified 
theoretically in terms of both efficiency and equity.  However, in practice, the difficulty 








Since 1975, when “urban triage” first entered the lexicon of urban planning, the 
idea has generated considerable praise, protest, and confusion.  As first defined by urban 
scholar Anthony Downs, urban triage was an implementation strategy for the Community 
Development Block Grant program.  In order to make the most of scarce funds and stop 
the spread of blight, Downs thought cities should prioritize the rehabilitation of areas in 
the early stages of decline over those in greater need.1  Controversial in its own right, the 
term came to symbolize much more.  While many planners saw a modified form of triage 
as an efficient strategy for dispensing federal funding, others denounced it as unfair and 
unnecessary.2  Other critics, seeing larger patterns of inequality at play, equated urban 
triage to urban renewal, benign neglect, and planned shrinkage, arguing its effects were 
both pernicious and pervasive.3  By the 1980s, the term had largely fallen out of use, but 
today it is making a comeback.  Few planners are familiar with urban triage by name, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Anthony Downs, “Using the Lessons of Experience to Allocate Resources in the Community 
Development Program,” in Recommendations for Community Development Planning: 
Proceedings of the HUD/RERC Workshops on Local Urban Renewal and Neighborhood 
Preservation (Chicago: Real Estate Research Corporation, 1975), 18-21. 
2 Richard P. Nathan, et al., Block Grants for Community Development (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1977), 302-332; and Peter Marcuse, Peter 
Medoff, and Andrea Pereira, “Triage as Urban Policy,” Social Policy 12, no. 3 (Winter 1982). 
3 Conrad Weiler, “Urban Euthanasia for Fun and Profit,” in Neighborhood Policy and Planning, 
ed. Phillip L. Clay and Robert M. Hollister (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983); James 
Kyung-Jin Lee, Urban Triage: Race and Fictions of Multiculturalism (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2004), 2; Deborah Wallace and Rodrick Wallace, A Plague on Your Houses: 
How New York Was Burned Down and National Public Health Crumbled (New York: Verso, 
1998), 24; and John T. Metzger, “Planned Abandonment: The Neighborhood Life-Cycle Theory 
and National Urban Policy,” Housing Policy Debate 11, no. 1 (2000): 7-40. 
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its logic has reappeared in targeting policies in cities like Youngstown, Flint, and Detroit, 
reigniting the debate over its meaning, merit, and morality.4 
This paper seeks to separate fact from fiction by examining the historical record 
of urban triage.  First it clarifies the many meanings of the term, distinguishing “classic” 
urban triage from other policies that have been called urban triage by proponents and 
critics.  Then, using planning records, newspaper articles, and interviews with planners 
involved in the cases, it analyzes the challenges planners faced, practically and 
politically, in their efforts to turn urban triage into policy in St. Louis and Cleveland. 
The paper argues that “classic” urban triage, as advanced by Downs and as 
applied in the cases, was distinct from policies of urban renewal or planned shrinkage and 
could, in theory, be used to advance both efficiency and equity goals.  Yet it proved 
difficult to implement.  Urban triage ran counter to the logic of ward-based political 
systems, which demanded investment in every neighborhood, and to the spirit of the 
nascent neighborhood movement, which saw all historic neighborhoods as capable of 
grassroots rehabilitation, given the proper support.  To critics, urban triage seemed to 
foreclose the possibility that majority black or Latino neighborhoods, which were often 
the most severely distressed, were capable or worthy of revitalization.  Rhetorically, the 
term “urban triage” also came to symbolize existing policies that conveyed advantages to 
whites and the affluent at the expense of racial minorities and the poor.  In the face of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For recent discussion of triage-like policies, see Robert A. Beauregard, “Strategic Thinking for 
Distressed Neighborhoods,” in The City After Abandonment, ed. Margaret Dewar and June 
Thomas (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 268-288; Dale E. Thomson, 
“Strategic, Geographic Targeting of Housing and Community Development Resources: A 
Conceptual Framework and Critical Review,” Urban Affairs Review 43, no. 5 (2008): 629-662; 
and Dale E. Thomson, “Strategic Geographic Targeting in Community Development: Examining 




such criticism, public officials rejected urban triage as unfair and politically unworkable, 
but leaders in shrinking cities today are reconsidering its logic as they recognize the need 


























Urban Triage in Theory 
 
To understand the history of urban triage, one must first disambiguate the varied 
meanings of the term.  Kleniewski identifies at least three definitions in the planning 
literature, which she terms “classic,” “narrow,” and “broad.”5  The classic definition is 
the subject of this paper.  It is the strategy articulated by Anthony Downs and proposed in 
somewhat different forms by planners in St. Louis and Cleveland in the 1970s.  The 
narrow definition is better known as “planned shrinkage.”  In contrast to the classic 
definition, the narrow definition implies the immediate withdrawal of services and the 
removal of residents from neighborhoods in severe decline in order to reduce the city’s 
costs. The broad definition of urban triage encompasses any urban policy that privileges 
areas in lesser need over those in greater need, whether intended or not.  Critics have 
equated these three definitions, arguing that all forms of triage promote efficiency and 
reduce equity by denying governmental assistance to the geographic areas that need it 
most. 6  This paper rejects that definition, arguing that classic urban triage is distinct from 
the narrow and broad definitions.  Classic urban triage can either support or undermine 
equity goals, depending on how the policy is formulated and implemented. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Nancy Kleniewski, “Triage and Urban Planning: A Case Study of Philadelphia,” International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 10, no. 4 (1986): 565-566. 
6 Marcuse, “Triage As Urban Policy,” 34. 
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“Classic” urban triage 
The term “triage” comes from the French trier, meaning to pick or cull.7  It first 
appeared in English in the 1700s in an agricultural context.  To triage meant to sort goods 
by quality, usually into three classes: best, middling, and worst.8  During World War I, 
triage came to mean the sorting of the wounded for medical care on the basis of 
efficiency rather than need.9  Unable to treat everyone, doctors sorted incoming patients 
into one of three categories: those with minor injuries who could go without immediate 
treatment; those seriously injured who might survive if treated immediately; and those 
gravely wounded and unlikely to survive, regardless of treatment.  In an effort to save the 
most lives, doctors gave priority attention to the second group—those most likely to 
benefit from treatment—rather than the third group—those in greatest need. 
In the 1970s, this definition of triage was transmuted first to social policy and 
then to urban policy.  A 1974 essay in Time argued that foreign food aid should be 
allocated not strictly on the basis of need but where it could do the most good—countries 
that had sufficient infrastructure and stability to distribute the needed aid effectively.10  It 
called this triage.  In 1975, Anthony Downs, a renowned scholar of urban policy and 
public administration who was then serving as president of the Real Estate Research 
Corporation in Chicago, became the first to apply the metaphor to the urban crisis.11  He 
likened the city to a battlefield, with dozens of neighborhoods in need of urgent care but 
with too few resources available to save them all.  In order to save the greatest share of 
the city as possible, he argued, policymakers had to strategize, giving priority to those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 “Triage,” The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Downs, “Using the Lessons of Experience,” 18. 
10 “What to Do: Costly Choices,” Time 104, no. 20 (Nov. 11, 1974): 102. 
11 Downs, “Using the Lessons of Experience,” 18-19. 
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areas experiencing slight decline, which could be stabilized with lower-cost interventions, 
over those that were already severely abandoned, which some planners then thought 
could only be saved through total clearance and redevelopment. 
His recommendations were framed as an implementation strategy for the 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program.12  The CDBG program had 
been established the year prior by Title I of the Housing and Community Development 
Act of 1974.13 It consolidated eight categorical programs—Model Cities, urban renewal, 
open space, urban beautification, historic preservation, neighborhood facilities, and water 
and sewer—into a single block grant, giving cities the authority to decide which program 
goals to emphasize and where.  The legislation specified that cities should give 
“maximum feasible priority to activities which will benefit low and moderate-income 
families or aid in the prevention of slums and blight,” but the proportion of funds that 
went toward low-income versus moderate-income families was not specified, giving 
cities considerable flexibility in how they allocated the grants.14 
The new law was representative of President Richard Nixon’s “New Federalism,” 
which devolved federal authority to local governments and shifted power from the central 
cities of the Northeast and Midwest to their suburbs and the Sun Belt.15  Previously the 
main beneficiaries of federal urban aid, Rust Belt cities lost funding in the new allocation.  
This transfer of benefits occurred despite growing need in older central cities, which in 
the early 1970s experienced accelerating population loss and job loss.  Unable to address 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid., 1. 
13 For a full discussion of the Community Development Block Grant program, see Nathan et al., 
Block Grants for Community Development, 16-74. 
14 Nathan et al., Block Grants for Community Development, 302. 
15 Roger Biles, The Fate of Cities: Urban America and the Federal Government, 1945-2000 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 160. 
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the full scope of the urban crisis with limited federal aid or their own resources, older 
central cities were forced to invest strategically and partner with the private sector to 
leverage scarce funds.16  Knowing that cities could not redevelop every neighborhood in 
need, Downs advised investing on the basis of triage, focusing resources on the 
neighborhoods that could be saved most efficiently in order to produce the greatest 
impact. 
Doing so would require planners to categorize the health of neighborhoods just as 
doctors categorized the health of patients.17  To determine whether a neighborhood was 
healthy, ill, or terminal, Downs developed a classification system based on five indicators 
of neighborhood decline: decreasing socioeconomic status; ethnic change from white to 
black or Latino occupancy; physical deterioration and decay of housing and 
infrastructure; increased pessimism about the area’s future among residents, investors, 
and public officials; and economic disinvestment, leading to tax foreclosure and 
abandonment.18  Based on the values of these criteria, neighborhoods could be classified 
into one of five stages.  Stage 1 neighborhoods were labeled “healthy.”  These areas were 
well maintained, middle or upper class, and, at the time, almost always predominately 
white.  Stage 2 and Stage 3 neighborhoods were labeled “in-between.”  These areas were 
beginning to show signs of neglect but could be restored to Stage 1 status through home 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 June Manning Thomas, Redevelopment and Race: Planning a Finer City in Postwar Detroit 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 138-139; and Anthony Downs, “A Basic 
Perspective Concerning the Community Development Program,” in Recommendations for 
Community Development Planning: Proceedings of the HUD/RERC Workshops on Local Urban 
Renewal and Neighborhood Preservation (Chicago: Real Estate Research Corporation, 1976), 14-
19. 
17 Downs, “Using the Lessons of Experience”; and Anthony Downs, “The Role of Neighborhoods 
in the Mature Metropolis,” in The Mature Metropolis, ed. Charles L. Leven (Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, 1978), 214-216. 
18 Downs, “Using the Lessons of Experience,” 2-4. 
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repair, code enforcement, and other rehabilitation programs.  Stage 4 and Stage 5 
neighborhoods were labeled “deteriorated.”  These areas were marked by high rates of 
crime, high rates of poverty, and widespread vacancy and abandonment.  Once a 
neighborhood had fallen to Stage 4 or Stage 5, Downs argued, nothing short of total 
clearance and redevelopment could return it to “healthy” Stage 1 status. 
This classification system reflected the conventional wisdom among real estate 
officials and planners that neighborhoods experienced natural and sequential decline as 
houses “filtered” down over time.19  According to this theory, new housing in the United 
States was built almost exclusively for the middle and upper classes at the metropolitan 
fringe.  As new housing was constructed, upper-income families moved outward, leaving 
behind aging housing stock in the central city that was passed down to white, middle-
income families, and then, as the neighborhood declined and maintenance costs mounted, 
to landlords who subdivided the properties and rented the units to lower-income families 
and people of color.  At this stage, further decline became inevitable due to redlining—
the denial of loans to neighborhoods inhabited by people of color.  The arrival of blacks 
or Latinos to an area was taken as a sign that it had reached the final stage in its life cycle 
and that further decline was inevitable; banks denied loans to homeowners on this basis, 
preventing them from upgrading their homes to stave off decline.20  Unable to increase 
profits through renovation, due to lack of financing and lack of demand from higher-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Downs, “A Basic Perspective,” 2-4.  For a disputed critique of Downs’s reliance on the 
neighborhood life cycle theory and Downs’s response, see John T. Metzger, “Planned 
Abandonment: The Neighborhood Life-Cycle Theory and National Urban Policy,” Housing 
Policy Debate 11, no. 1 (2000): 7-40; and Anthony Downs, “Comment on John T. Metzger’s 
‘Planned Abandonment: The Neighborhood Life-Cycle Theory and National Urban Policy,” 
Housing Policy Debate 11, no. 1 (2000): 41-54. 
20 Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 43-44. 
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income tenants, landlords ceased to maintain their properties, renting the units until they 
were no longer habitable and then abandoning them.  After this final stage of the life 
cycle, cities acquired the abandoned buildings, demolished them, and redeveloped the 
land for new purposes in a process that was called “slum clearance” or “urban renewal.” 
 Downs did not support the policies that produced the “filtering” process, but he 
saw its outcome—neighborhoods in distinct but definable life cycle stages—as an 
empirical reality, and one that planners had to address by tailoring policies.  In areas with 
slight decline, for example, code enforcement could be an effective tool to prevent the 
spread of blight.  Pressuring property owners to do maintenance would help keep up the 
character of the neighborhood and ensure further investment.  But in areas that had 
already experienced severe blight and vacancy—where renting property was only 
marginally profitable—code enforcement might only accelerate decline by encouraging 
owners to abandon their properties.  In these highly blighted areas, Downs believed, 
redevelopment would have to be preceded by partial or total clearance of blight through 
demolition.  Like proponents of urban renewal, Downs assumed that badly deteriorated 
neighborhoods could only be revived through total reconstruction.  Even then, 
redevelopment would only succeed if the blighted area were adjacent to a more stable 
neighborhood—isolated urban renewal projects often failed.  That made “slum clearance” 
a costly and risky proposition.21  The most effective strategy, Downs believed, would be 
to concentrate spending in areas with only moderate decline, where a minor infusion of 
resources might lead to significant improvement by restoring investor confidence and 
sparking private actors to contribute to the upgrading of the neighborhood. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Downs, “Using the Lessons of Experience,” 13-18. 
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Yet realizing that politicians would be under pressure to spend funds everywhere, 
Downs developed spending recommendations for all three neighborhood types.  Healthy 
neighborhoods would receive the least funding; only low-cost, high-visibility projects, 
like planting trees and providing new street furniture, would be approved if politically 
necessary.  More funding would be directed to very deteriorated areas, but only for 
demolition and the provision of social welfare.  In these areas, gradual abandonment 
would continue, but the city would maintain public services and increase social welfare 
along the lines of the Model Cities program.  The greatest share of funds would be 
targeted to in-between areas for physical redevelopment, where public spending could not 
only reduce blight but also induce further investment from the private sector, thereby 
maximizing the value of the public’s investment.22 Downs called this three-part strategy, 
balancing the desire for efficiency with political need, “modified triage.”23  Kleniewski 
later termed it “classic” urban triage—the prototypical case.24 
 
“Narrow” urban triage: planned shrinkage 
While Downs was the first to define urban triage, his is not the most common 
definition in the literature.  The term urban triage has been used most often to refer to 
“planned shrinkage,” a distinct policy that Kleniewski has called “narrow” urban triage 
based on its similar logic.  Whereas “classic” urban triage called for the gradual clearance 
of the most deteriorated neighborhoods, eased by the maintenance of basic services and 
increases in social welfare to the remaining residents, planned shrinkage called for the 
immediate clearance of deteriorated areas through mandatory relocation and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid., 18-21. 
23 Ibid., 18. 
24 Kleniewski, “Triage and Urban Planning,” 565. 
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withdrawal of public services.  The primary goal was not to maximize the impact of 
redevelopment.  Instead it was retrenchment.  Planned shrinkage aimed to reduce the 
effective footprint of the city; cleared land would be fenced off and withdrawn from the 
market, enabling the city to cut services and infrastructure to the area.  The savings could 
be redirected to in-between neighborhoods, increasing the quality and concentration of 
services provided there.  In-between areas would also benefit from an influx of relocated 
residents, increasing density and shoring up the tax base. 
The lead advocate for this policy was New York’s housing director, Roger Starr.  
In a famous New York Times Magazine article, published in 1976, Starr embraced the 
planned shrinkage of the South Bronx and Brownsville, two rapidly deteriorating New 
York neighborhoods.  Given the severity of New York’s budget crisis, and the stunning 
pace of abandonment in those neighborhoods, Starr thought the city should immediately 
cease all efforts to rehabilitate them.  Instead, he proposed intentionally accelerating the 
decline of both by offering incentives to the remaining residents to relocate to other 
neighborhoods.  Doing so would enable the government to cut off services to the vacated 
areas, realizing a cost savings, and let the land sit idle, perhaps for decades, until 
economic conditions improved sufficiently to justify their redevelopment.  At the same 
time, Starr hoped planned shrinkage would directly benefit other areas of the city by 
sparing them service cutbacks and by adding to their density by relocating displaced 
residents.25  As George Will, writing approvingly of Starr’s plan in the Washington Post, 
put it, “Parts of the city may have to be allowed to die, so that the rest of it can live.”26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Joseph P. Fried, “City’s Housing Administrator Proposes ‘Planned Shrinkage’ of Some 
Slums,” New York Times, February 3, 1976, 35. 




Another proponent, urban planning professor William C. Baer, argued that 
shrinkage was necessary and salutary whether it was planned or not.  Like Downs and 
Starr, Baer believed that urban neighborhoods passed through discernible life stages over 
time, but he denied that all neighborhoods could be revitalized.  “There is a refusal to 
admit that older cities or neighborhoods can die,” he wrote. “They may be ‘sick’ or 
‘deteriorating,’ but the belief is nevertheless held by expert and politician alike that with 
proper treatment these areas will recover to survive forever.”27  Baer disagreed, arguing 
that the inevitable, natural, and final stage through which all neighborhoods must pass 
was death.  “Urban death—or at least neighborhood death—in the nation’s cities is 
coming to pass.  It may be hindered by expertise, detoured by cajolery, impeded by 
charismatic leadership, and delayed by simple faith; but it will come.  It is an event 
inevitably linked to the preceding urban growth and development.”28  He concluded that 
“inefficient triage”—that is, de facto triage, occurring unplanned through the status quo 
of abandonment—was the most practical vehicle for achieving neighborhood euthanasia, 
the just and necessary end, he felt, to dying urban areas.29 
Economist James Heilbrun and lawyer Susan Hedges Patton, by contrast, sought 
to achieve the same end as Starr—the consolidation of neighborhoods—through more 
equitable means.  In 1979, Heilbrun proposed a three-part program to achieve what he 
termed “neighborhood consolidation”: the federal government would finance housing 
allowances to enable displaced residents to relocate within the city to redevelopment 
areas; the city would compensate displaced residents and property owners with revenue 
from a special tax on redevelopment areas meant to capture the increase in value from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 William C. Baer, “On the Death of Cities,” The Public Interest 45 (Fall 1976): 3. 
28 Ibid., 18. 
29 Ibid., 19. 
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influx of residents and capital; and a new local public body would be created to plan and 
run the program.30  In 1981, Patton, then a law clerk on the Sixth Circuit of the United 
States Court of Appeals, proposed an alternative plan in the Buffalo Law Review that 
would use land banking to obtain properties in vacated areas and hold them until 
redevelopment was both prudent and profitable.31  Both these schemes endorsed the 
principle of clearing neighborhoods in order to reduce the effective footprint of the city 
and achieve cost savings, but tried to do so with minimum harm to displaced residents. 
 
“Broad” urban triage 
Other commentators have used urban triage as a catchall term to signify any urban 
policy that benefits white, middle-income neighborhoods at the expense of low-income, 
nonwhite neighborhoods, despite greater need in the latter.  This “broad” definition of 
urban triage is meant to encapsulate policies said to have the effect of triage, regardless of 
means or intent.  It has been used to denounce policies that preceded the coining of 
“urban triage” and that followed its rejection.  Despite the apparent failure of “classic” 
and “narrow” policies wherever they were proposed, critics argue that urban triage, in the 
broadest sense, has been widespread and destructive in application.32 
Marcuse, Medoff, and Periera define urban triage as “the exclusion of a particular 
geographic area from service by governmental programs, despite its need for them, on the 
grounds that the very intensity of those needs make that service in the area inefficient.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 James Heilbrun, “On the Theory and Policy of Neighborhood Consolidation,” Journal of the 
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Urban triage in this sense is often an indirect result of policy.  As an example, they cite 
the allocation of library funding in Los Angeles on the basis of existing reader demand.  
Because reader demand is highest in affluent areas, the policy has the effect of funding 
libraries in high-income areas at greater levels than libraries in low-income areas, even 
though library services are arguably more important for low-income users.  In a separate 
paper, Strickland and Judd offer another example of indirect triage: investment in central 
business districts rather than distressed neighborhoods.33  Job growth and a stable tax 
base may ultimately benefit the poor, but if these long-term priorities come at the expense 
of community development, low-income residents may suffer in the short term as result 
of the tradeoff, while business interests will be enriched. 
 Urban triage has also been used in this broad sense to indict policies that preceded 
Downs’s and Starr’s proposals.  Critics of planned shrinkage, for example, argue that 
although Roger Starr’s specific recommendations were rejected by city officials, his ideas 
were already reflected in existing policy.34  In particular, they argue that the burning of 
the South Bronx in the mid-1970s could be blamed, in part, on a 1974 RAND report, 
which the city used to justify the closure of several firehouses in the South Bronx.35  The 
authors of the RAND report deny culpability, but it has been widely cited and is the 
subject of two books, A Plague on Your Houses: How New York Was Burned Down and 
National Public Health Crumbled and The Fires: How a Computer Formula Burned 
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Down New York City—And Determined the Future of American Cities.36  These books 
argue that urban triage was the status quo policy of New York City.  As Flood puts it, 
“Starr’s real mistake … wasn’t his ideas so much as his candor—the city already had a de 
facto planned shrinkage policy; Starr just wanted to admit as much and manage it more 
comprehensively.”37 
 Urban triage has also been used in this broad sense to describe neoliberal urban 
policies that harmed inner-city racial communities in the 1980s and afterwards.  Lee uses 
urban triage as a synonym for “redevelopment,” David Harvey’s term “organized 
abandonment,” and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s term “benign neglect.”38  Both 
urban triage and benign neglect, Lee claims, were theses meant “to hasten death for urban 
communities of color deemed pathological and therefore expendable” and “to justify that 
principle as a matter of social policy.”39  Weiler describes urban triage as a ruse for 
redevelopment and gentrification.  “In essence,” he argued, “the triage argument really 
amounts to the following: inner-city land close to the downtown is or soon will be very 
valuable both to city governments and to private developers; let us systematically use 
government to clear it through triage for future private development and at the same time 
move its present occupants outward to outer-city or suburban locations where it may be 
argued they will be better off but in any case they will cost the city less than in their 
present location.”40 
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 These critics saw little difference between classic, narrow, and broad urban triage.  
Weiler, for example, refers to “triage and its synonyms of planned shrinkage, planned 
abandonment, planned death, and such,” lumping all of these terms and their proponents, 
including Downs, Starr, and Baer, together.41  But as the discussion of Downs’s proposal 
and the cases will show, “classic” urban triage was a distinct policy that could, at least in 


















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Urban Triage in Practice 
 
There are few cases in the planning literature of applied urban triage.  An early 
study of the Community Development Block Grant program found that many cities 
followed a “modified triage pattern” as part of “a neighborhood conservation and growth 
strategy designed primarily to prevent urban blight,” but with the exception of Cleveland 
and St. Louis, the evidence does not point toward an intentional strategy of triage but 
rather a gradual shift of emphasis as ongoing Urban Renewal and Model Cities era 
projects were phased out.42  Kleniewski cites Durham, England and Philadelphia as 
examples of triage to show that similar policies were proposed prior to the mid-1970s and 
outside the context of fiscal crisis, but neither case closely matches “classic” urban 
triage.43  Schmidt analyzes a case in Milwaukee where planners applied a targeting policy 
that was influenced by urban triage.  She warns that if the criteria for targeting are unfair 
or based on manipulated data, then neighborhoods will be wrongfully excluded from 
redevelopment and, in effect, redlined.44  Finally, Pratter, an author of the so-called 
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“Team Four Plan” and a proponent of urban triage in St. Louis, discusses the political 
obstacles that stopped the enactment of an explicit triage policy there in 1975.45  
This paper adds to this limited set by analyzing contentious attempts to apply 
urban triage in St. Louis and Cleveland in the 1970s.  In St. Louis, “classic” urban triage 
was proposed twice—first in the progressive 1972 St. Louis Development Program and 
again in the more divisive 1975 “Team Four Plan”—but one can see elements of a triage 
strategy as far back as the city’s 1947 Comprehensive Plan and its 1950s era code 
enforcement program.46  In Cleveland, “classic” urban triage was first proposed in the 
1975 Cleveland Policy Planning Report as part of a package of policies intended to 
promote equity.47  Both the St. Louis and the Cleveland cases demonstrate the 
considerable barriers to implementing urban triage, calling into question whether triage 
can be an effective strategy for achieving its stated goals of efficiency or, in the 
Cleveland case, equity. 
 
St. Louis 
In St. Louis, planners have warned for a century that the city’s inability to annex 
land—owing to its legal separation from St. Louis County in 1876—would lead to the 
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gradual loss of its tax base as industry and wealthy residents relocated to new facilities 
and housing in the suburbs.  The 1917 plan, written by Harland Bartholomew, the city’s 
first and longest-serving “Engineer” of urban planning, identified suburbanization as one 
of the principal threats to the future of St. Louis.48  The 1936 Urban Land Policy warned 
that decline was already taking its toll: “To state the condition in its simplest terms—if 
adequate measures are not taken, the city is faced with gradual economic and social 
collapse.  The old central areas of the city are being abandoned and this insidious trend 
will continue until the entire city is engulfed.”49  By 1947, the Comprehensive Plan, the 
last of Bartholomew’s tenure, warned that a full third of the city required substantial 
rehabilitation or redevelopment. The plan labeled seven percent of the city “obsolete”—
requiring complete clearance and redevelopment—and another 27 percent “blighted”—
requiring substantial rehabilitation.50 
In a harbinger of urban triage, the plan called for prioritizing the rehabilitation of 
blighted neighborhoods over the reconstruction of obsolete areas.51  This preference for 
rehabilitation of “blighted” neighborhoods over the reconstruction of “obsolete” areas is 
not clearly reflected in the planning history of St. Louis in the 1950s and 1960s.  After 
the passage of the federal Housing Act of 1949 and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 
1956, St. Louis aggressively pursued clearance and redevelopment, particularly in its 
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central corridor, primarily for the purpose of industrial development.52  However, one can 
see the emphasis on rehabilitation in the city’s code enforcement program. Started in 
1953, the St. Louis Neighborhood Rehabilitation Program concentrated enforcement in 
neighborhoods in the early stages of decline, like Cherokee and Hyde Park.  These 
neighborhoods were typically white, middle-income, and home to active residents; black 
neighborhoods were also chosen for concentrated enforcement, but only if the racial 
composition of the neighborhoods was deemed stable, not in transition.53  This emphasis 
on racially stable neighborhoods in the early stages of slight decline continued until the 
mid-1960s when, facing criticism in the press and pressure from neighborhood 
organizations, the city chose to target the new Federally Assisted Code Enforcement 
(FACE) program to neighborhoods in greater distress.  Evaluations of St. Louis’s FACE 
program found this new need-based targeting strategy to be less effective than the prior 
strategy, and in the early 1970s the city returned to emphasizing efficiency rather than 
need as the basis for concentrated code enforcement.54 
This renewed emphasis on efficiency is evident in the 1972 St. Louis 
Development Program, an ambitious, 15-year, $1.4 billion plan to revitalize the city.  
Like the 1947 plan, the 1972 plan advocates tailoring different services to different 
neighborhoods: “This strategy is based on the concept of first preserving those 
neighborhood districts which are still essentially sound, maintaining and improving 
districts which are threatened by encroaching blight, and systematically rebuilding and 
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rehabilitating those districts which are extensively deteriorated.”55  But the plan goes on 
to acknowledge that many of the areas requiring reconstruction could not be feasibly 
redeveloped within a 15-year time span without significant increases in federal aid.  With 
the exception of designated Urban Renewal and Model Cities areas, the plan labeled 
these areas “Interim Action Areas.”56  These were to receive increased community 
services; increased social services, particularly for youth; and a program of land banking 
to gradually prepare for future redevelopment.  They would not be redeveloped in the 
foreseeable future, despite their need.  In other words, the Development Program called 
for urban triage, three years before Downs coined the term. 
This strategy was echoed by a 1973 RAND report that shocked city leaders with 
its dour assessment of St. Louis’s future.  Based on projections carried forward from the 
late 1960s, the RAND report assessed three possible futures for the city: “continued 
decline; stabilization in a new role as an increasingly black suburb; and return to a former 
role as the center of economic activity in the metropolitan area.”57  Of these, the first, 
continued decline, was deemed the most likely, while the second, a new role as “a large 
suburb among many other suburbs,” was considered the best-case scenario.  Even this 
limited positive outcome would not be possible without a significant commitment of 
external revenue from federal revenue sharing, state revenue sharing, and the creation of 
a regional income tax or revenue sharing base.  Like the 1972 Development Program, the 
RAND report also called for tailoring services to varying neighborhood needs, upending 
the principle of providing the same set of public services and enforcing the same 
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regulations in all neighborhoods.58  But it warned that doing so would not be sufficient to 
improve the city’s trajectory—merely ameliorative. 
This new emphasis on triage generated mixed reactions.  In an editorial dated 
January 26, 1973, the St. Louis Globe-Democrat board embraced the strategy: “The city 
can’t do everything at once – it must establish priorities, beginning with areas that are 
still savable from decay.”59  They commended the city plan director, Norman Murdoch, 
for taking this approach.  However, the black community began voicing discontent with 
the city’s planning strategy.  In 1973, Dick Gephardt and John Roach, two white 
aldermen who represented South Side wards and identified with the so-called “Young 
Turk” faction of the board, proposed bills that would have allegedly authorized a massive 
program of housing rehabilitation on the South Side and housing demolition on the North 
Side.60  Black leaders objected to these bills as an effort to save the South Side at the 
expense of the North Side.  The bills were not passed, but they became a symbol of 
unequal treatment for the black community.  Black leaders also objected to the city’s first 
CDBG application, which they felt did not target sufficient funds to North Side wards.61 
These tensions erupted three years later after urban triage was proposed again, 
this time in more caustic language and with less emphasis on social welfare, through the 
so-called “Team Four Plan.”  In 1973, the city began the process of writing a new 
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comprehensive master plan to replace the 1947 plan.  Looking for outside opinions to 
both guide and challenge the city’s planners, the City Plan Commission hired Team Four 
Inc. as consultants to the project.62  Founded in 1969 by four graduates of Washington 
University—William H. Albinson, Brian W.P. Kent, S. Jerome Pratter, and Richard 
Ward—Team Four combined expertise in urban law, architecture, and urban design in 
one multidisciplinary planning firm.63  The firm worked independently from the City 
Plan Commission, drafting seven technical memos to inform the planning process.64 
One of these memos—Technical Memorandum 6b—gained notoriety as the 
“Team Four Plan.”  This memo, titled “City Wide Implementation Strategies for the 
Draft Comprehensive Plan,” concerned strategies for adopting, staging, budgeting, and 
implementing the Comprehensive Plan.65  Submitted to city officials on March 31, 1975, 
the memo recommended categorizing all areas of the city into one of three types—
conservation, redevelopment, or depletion.  The designations would be based on a set of 
criteria including the age and physical condition of the housing stock, the availability of 
private financing, levels of public service, and population stability.  The city would then 
tailor its development strategy to each area type, focusing foremost on conservation 
areas, followed by redevelopment areas, and then depletion areas, in order to protect and 
grow the greatest share of the city’s tax base with scarce funds.66 
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 Conservation areas were defined as areas that continued to attract private 
investment.  These were healthy areas of the city that already enjoyed abundant public 
services as well as private business activity.  According to the memo, the success of these 
areas rested upon “continued high level public services.”67  Any restriction of services 
could shake the confidence of private actors, leading the city to lose its most successful 
neighborhoods. “If these areas are lost,” the memo warns, “no plan or program can hope 
to save the City or renew what is left.”68  The maintenance of high-quality services to 
these areas would therefore need to be a “top priority” for the city; conservation areas 
were to provide the foundation for the city’s renewal.69 
To ensure the stability of these areas, the memo called for infill development that 
matched the character of existing housing; increases in school funding; greater police 
protection; strict code enforcement through an occupancy permit-based enforcement 
program; restrictions on transit-oriented development; and buffering between 
neighborhoods and new transit lines.  The memo also encouraged private initiatives to 
supplement or replace public services.  The memo recommended user fees for trash 
service and code enforcement; the establishment of neighborhood associations to fund 
special services and improvements; the creation of business associations to finance and 
manage industrial parks and shopping centers; and the creation of a private-public 
authority to manage the central business district and pay for improvements through a 
special assessment on central business district properties.70 
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 Redevelopment areas were referred to as areas “at the critical point between 
progress and decay.”71  The memo did not identify specific redevelopment areas, but it 
suggested that any area suitable for Missouri’s Chapter 353 Tax Abatement program 
would meet the criteria of a redevelopment area.72  Passed in 1945, the Chapter 353 
program grants developers long-term tax abatements and the power of eminent domain 
over “blighted” properties.73  The program is typically used to redevelop individual 
parcels in areas of potential growth.  In 1975, most properties declared “blighted” under 
the program were zoned commercial or industrial, and they were primarily located in the 
central corridor—either in the central business district (the entirety of which was declared 
“blighted” under the program) or Central West End. As of 1975, only a handful of parcels 
had been targeted for redevelopment on the North Side.74 
The memo recommended pursuing redevelopment strategically.  Redevelopment 
projects would only be approved if they could be paired with capital improvements and 
an increase in public services, including the onset of strict code enforcement.  Along with 
use of the Chapter 353 program, the memo also endorsed the use of special assessment 
districts to make redevelopment self-financing.  Zoning would take the form of planned 
unit developments, enabling developers and the city to negotiate terms.  Transit-oriented 
development would be encouraged, and where applicable, the city would use Missouri’s 
Planned Industrial Expansion legislation to spur industrial development when private 
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financing was not feasible.  Each redevelopment district would also have a citizens’ 
advisory council to ensure the fair treatment of current residents.75 
Depletion areas were identified as “areas of spotty City services and red lining – 
where large numbers of the unemployed, the elderly and the recipients of welfare are left 
to wait for assistance which does not seem to be forthcoming.”76  No depletion areas were 
identified specifically, but the memo notes that in 1917 there were 3,200 abandoned 
buildings in the City, and “virtually all of these were located in Depletion Areas.”77  Then 
as now, the majority of the abandoned buildings were located on the North Side.  The 
memo’s description of depletion areas acknowledges the hardship faced by residents due 
to the absence of both private and public investment, but it warns that the need for total 
reconstruction and the absence of resources puts the city in a bind: “Simply stated, the 
City cannot abandon those trapped in Depletion areas, nor can it ignore the eventual need 
for complete redevelopment of these areas.”78 
 In depletion areas, the memo recommended continuing basic services but 
prohibiting scattershot redevelopment.  The memo was insistent that essential services 
should be continued: “Police, fire and sanitation service cannot be curtailed prematurely, 
as has been the case, according to critics, in these areas.”79  However, the memo 
recommended restricting new development, requiring any development in these areas to 
be planned with concurrent capital improvements—investments that would be made first 
in designated Redevelopment Areas and only later in Depletion Areas, when a market 
had returned.  In the meantime, the city would use its Land Reutilization Authority as a 
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land bank, gathering parcels through tax foreclosure and holding them indefinitely until 
market conditions permitted large-scale redevelopment of the area.  The city would not 
seek short-term profit by selling the parcels or establish a homesteading program.  At the 
same time, the city would not seek to accelerate abandonment, avoiding strict code 
enforcement in depletion areas for this reason.80 
The plan registered as a shock to the public, especially the black community, in 
part because it came shrouded in secrecy.  Following a tip, a reporter at the St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch requested a copy of the memo and the most recent draft of the 
Comprehensive Plan from the mayor’s office.  The mayor, who was in an ongoing spat 
with the newspaper, refused to provide it.  The newspaper then filed a federal Freedom of 
Information Act request, obtaining a copy of the memo through the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development.  On May 19, 1975, the Post-Dispatch published the 
first excerpts of the memo under the headline, “Plan Said To Hurt Black Area In City.”81 
Even after the story went to press, the Community Development Commission refused to 
release copies of the memo.  After a week, the commission partially reversed course, 
providing copies to four aldermen.82  It did not permit Team Four Inc. to release the full 
memo publicly—including a new preface defending the firm’s recommendations—until 
February of 1976.83 By then, the memo’s reputation as a “secret plan” had long been set. 
The Post-Dispatch’s article characterized the “Team Four Plan” as a strategy to 
reduce services to the predominantly black North Side and depopulate the area.  Philip 
Sutton, the reporter, wrote that Team Four had recommended “deteriorating areas on their 
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way to abandonment get only a minimum level of services.”  Quoting black community 
leaders, the paper reported the plan “could spell doom” for “an area generally bounded by 
Twentieth Street, Delmar Boulevard, Natural Bridge Avenue and the western city 
limits”—an area on the North Side that had been labeled “obsolete” in 1947 and in need 
of “reconstruction” in 1972 but was still home to roughly 166,000 residents in 1975.  
Former Alderman C.B. Broussard, a black Democratic leader in the 26th Ward, said that 
the city had already adopted Team Four’s policies but wouldn’t admit it: “It’s happening 
without a doubt.”  The article closed with a fateful quote from Alderman Milton F. 
Svetanics, of the 27th Ward, defending the plan.  He argued, “We have to make a choice 
about which areas we want to save.  Other areas will have to suffer benign neglect.”84 
 The term “benign neglect” became synonymous with the “Team Four Plan.”  
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then serving in the Nixon administration as Counselor 
to the President for Urban Affairs, had coined the phrase in 1970 in a memo to the 
president on the “Status of Negroes” that was leaked to the New York Times and 
published on March 1, 1970.85  In the memo, Moynihan argued that despite an increase in 
female-headed households and the high incidence of “anti-social behavior among young 
black males,” social and economic conditions for blacks were improving overall.  “The 
time may have come,” he concluded, “when the issue of race could benefit from a period 
of ‘benign neglect.’ … We may need a period in which Negro progress continues and 
racial rhetoric fades.”86  Moynihan intended the memo as a rebuke to Vice President 
Spiro Agnew, whose racially charged rhetoric was inflaming tensions with the black 
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community, but instead the memo itself became a symbol of such rhetoric.  The memo 
was widely denounced; critics accused the Nixon administration of treating the black 
community’s concerns, in policy and in rhetoric, with “benign neglect.”87  
 In St. Louis, “benign neglect” became the rallying cry against the “Team Four 
Plan.”  After the Post-Dispatch published its story, 200 people met at the St. Louis Urban 
League offices to protest the plan and form a coalition to organize against it.  At the 
meeting, Ernest Calloway, a black urban affairs professor at St. Louis University, said 
that St. Louis banks and insurance companies had followed an implicit policy of “benign 
neglect” of the black community for many years, “and many feel it has been the city 
policy too.”88  At a later meeting, Alderwoman JoAnne Wayne of the 1st Ward warned 
that the “Team Four Plan” was designed to displace the black community from St. Louis:  
“The Team Four plan is a strategy to get rid of blacks, and baby, if we don’t get together 
and really stick together, we’ll be … well, not right here in the city of St. Louis. I don’t 
know where we’ll be.”89  The St. Louis Argus, a black newspaper, characterized it as “the 
so-called Plan Four proposal designed to lift essential city services and let the near-North 
side of St. Louis die.”90  In July 1975, the Ad-Hoc Committee Against Team Four 
Projections—formed by the Federation of Block Units, Inc.; Yeatmen District 
Community Corp.; and Jeff-Vander-Lou, Inc.—circulated a petition opposing the plan.  It 
stated, “We are disappointed and disgusted that we still have policies of benign neglect, 
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and it appears that many neighborhoods will be destroyed.”  The petition continued, 
“150,000 families are threatened with displacement as part of the plan.”91 
 In point of fact, the memo did not specify the location of depletion areas, nor did 
it call for the withdrawal of essential services or dispersal of the black community.  Team 
Four intentionally declined to map the location of conservation, redevelopment, or 
depletion zones or specify their size; the memo never discusses race; and the memo is 
clear that essential services like police and fire must not be reduced.92  However, the 
firm’s urban triage strategy would not have been race-neutral and its likely geographic 
impact could easily be inferred.  The memo refers to depletion areas as areas with 
significant housing abandonment.  In 1975, those areas were almost exclusively black 
and on the North Side.  The memo also connects redevelopment to the Chapter 353 
program, which was used predominantly in the central corridor.  So it not surprising that 
black leaders connected the memo to maps that had been published in the 1947 General 
Plan and the 1972 Development Program.  Just as the 1972 plan had replaced “obsolete” 
areas with “reconstruction” or “interim action” areas, black leaders assumed the “Team 
Four Plan” would replace “reconstruction” with “depletion.”93 
The controversy ultimately scuttled the proposed 1975 Interim Comprehensive 
Plan.94  When the Community Development Commission released the third draft of the 
Interim Comprehensive Plan for public comment in June 1975, it included a statement 
that said the commission “rejects any plan, draft or strategy which advocates any no-
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growth philosophy or any form of discrimination as to race, age, sex or creed.”95  The 
commission also modified the plan itself, removing references to “abandonment” and 
deleting the map, printed previously in the 1972 Development Program, that identified 
areas for conservation, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and maintenance and 
improvement.96  These changes were not sufficient to allay the black community’s fears, 
and the planning effort was ultimately abandoned.  The 1975 plan was never adopted. 
Despite its official rejection, many observers believe the “Team Four Plan” was 
carried out as the de facto policy of subsequent administrations.  Pratter himself argued in 
1977 that the “memo’s basic policies have proven to be ones that have been advocated 
under different names not only in numerous other cities but also in the city of St. Louis as 
well.”97  While the city never adopted a no-growth policy for the North Side, St. Louis 
continued to target most of its physical redevelopment projects to the central corridor.98  
In the first decade of the CDBG program, St. Louis spent as much on brick-and-mortar 
projects in the four wards of the central corridor as it did on all twelve wards of the 
impoverished North Side.99  On the North Side, CDBG was primarily used to fund social 
services.100  According to historian Colin Gordon, “Targeted areas were identified less by 
demonstrable need than by the willingness of private interests to invest in them.  
Redevelopment, in turn, rested on an elastic definition of blight that put the health of the 
[central business district]—and then simply the health of the overall “business climate”—
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at the top of the urban agenda.”101  Black leaders also linked specific policy decisions—in 
particular, Mayor James Conway’s decision in 1979 to close Homer G. Phillips, a well 
regarded public hospital on the north side that was considered “the crown jewel of the 
entire black community”—to the enduring influence of Team Four.102 
The “Team Four Plan” remains politically toxic today.  As recently as 2008, U.S. 
Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) held a Congressional Field Hearing in St. Louis 
to air grievances about the Team Four plan in light of new redevelopment plans for the 
North Side.103  Barbara A. Geisman, then serving as Executive Director for Community 
Development for the city of St. Louis, testified that she had never read the “Team Four 
Plan” and that it had no influence over city policy: “I have never read it and I don’t know 
anybody else who has ever read it, and it really isn’t relevant to anything that we have 
been doing for the past 7 years.”104  Nevertheless, several black leaders testified that St. 
Louis’s development patterns from the 1970s to the 2000s reflected the spirit of the 
“Team Four Plan,” if not the letter, noting that St. Louis’s central corridor had 
experienced a revival after decades of reinvestment but that the North Side continued to 
decline.  The hearings prompted William Albinson, a principal of Team Four Inc., to 
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defend his firm’s reputation in an op-ed in the St. Louis American, and city planners and 
elected officials once again politically distanced themselves from urban triage.105 
 
Cleveland 
In Cleveland, urban triage generated none of the controversy of the “Team Four 
Plan,” but it also generated little public awareness or physical impact.  Though a strategy 
of triage—framed in explicitly egalitarian and redistributive terms—is plainly evident in 
the city’s 1975 Policy Planning Report and Community Development Block Grant 
applications, its practical effect appears to have been quite limited. 
Cleveland planners first adopted “a triage philosophy” in the mid-1970s under the 
leadership of Planning Director Norman Krumholz.106  Krumholz is well known among 
planners as the leading proponent of equity planning, a planning philosophy which stated 
as its goal the promotion of “a wider range of choices for those individuals and groups 
who have few, if any, choices.”107  As an equity planner, Krumholz sought to act as an 
activist within government, using rigorous, impartial research to promote policies that 
would benefit the poor and disadvantaged.  Under his leadership, the planning 
commission fought to maintain its independence from both elected officials and public 
opinion, basing its recommendations on policy research with little public input.108  The 
commission also deemphasized zoning and comprehensive planning, dismissing them as 
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ineffective tools for managing Cleveland’s decline.109  The Policy Planning Report was 
exemplary of equity planning in this regard.  It contained no traditional zoning maps, but 
it cited 28 research papers in support of its policy recommendations.110 
Krumholz was also known for his frank acknowledgement of fiscal distress—
which Herbert Gans hoped would inspire a new era of “cutback planning.”111.  Soon after 
joining the Carl Stokes administration in 1969, Krumholz identified rising poverty and 
the city’s emerging fiscal crisis as Cleveland’s greatest challenges.  In his first memo to 
incoming Mayor Ralph Perk in 1971, Krumholz listed ten pages of ideas for cutting costs 
and raising revenues.112  His signature achievements as Planning Director included 
money-saving moves to offload the city’s lakefront parks to the state park system and 
regionalize the transit system while locking in low-cost fares for Cleveland residents.113  
Krumholz also fought unsuccessfully to stop the mayor and city council from providing 
subsidies to downtown developers without guarantees of local hiring and increased tax 
revenues.114  He opposed such subsidies on both moral and fiscal grounds.  “While 
making downtown a more attractive place is a worthy goal,” he argued, “it is not as 
urgent as slowing the rate of deterioration in the city’s neighborhoods.”115   
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Although he has received little attention for his pioneering work in this regard, 
Krumholz is also arguably the first “shrinking cities” planner.  He was among the first to 
contemplate what neighborhoods could become after abandonment if redevelopment 
were not possible.  In a 1978 interview, Krumholz said, “It is very difficult to talk about 
cities like Cleveland—which are major urbanized, heavy production, durable goods-
producing cities—becoming semi-rural, and yet in neighborhoods like West Central and 
Hough you can look through the blocks … Nobody is there anymore.”116  Krumholz did 
not consider these abandoned areas suitable for housing redevelopment due to the evident 
lack of demand.  Instead, he envisioned new low-density uses: “Whether somebody will 
consume that for urbanized use or not, nobody can tell.  But surely that land can be used 
for something more amenable, maybe a regional park, farmland, or who knows.”117 
 These concerns and convictions are evident in the Cleveland Policy Planning 
Report, the first plan in Cleveland to evince a triage philosophy.  Published in 1975, the 
report called for bold public action on the federal and local levels to assist poor families.  
It recommended a federally guaranteed minimum income regardless of employment 
status; direct federal payments to low-income families to obtain housing in middle-class 
neighborhoods; and a local public service program to hire unemployed residents.118  If the 
federal government did not provide direct housing payments to low-income families, the 
report endorsed the reinstatement of federal programs to build and repair subsidized 
housing.  However, it opposed constructing low-income housing in deteriorated 
neighborhoods; any subsidized, low-income housing would be built in “small-scale, 
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scattered-site developments” and sited “in good residential areas, particularly in the 
suburbs.”119  The goal of these policies was to enable poor families to move out of 
deteriorated inner-city neighborhoods and into middle-class neighborhoods that had 
higher quality housing, greater access to jobs, and less residential segregation. 
 These social and housing policies were coupled with a series of community 
development recommendations that fell within the rubric of triage.  Neighborhoods on 
the verge of decline would be given higher priority for physical investment than 
neighborhoods in severe decline.120  Rather than subsidize new housing in deteriorated 
areas, the city would prioritize the rehabilitation of existing housing stock in “middle 
areas,” where public investment could spur renewed private commitment to the 
neighborhoods.  As the most blighted areas continued to lose population, abetted by the 
hoped-for federal housing subsidies, the city would move aggressively to demolish 
condemned structures, clear and maintain vacant lots, and control rat infestation, while 
maintaining all essential services.121 
The report justified its urban triage strategy on grounds of both equity and 
efficiency.  On the one hand, it argued that deteriorated neighborhoods were harmful 
environments that limited the prospects of the poor.  The goal of increasing equity was 
therefore best served by relocating low-income residents to middle-class neighborhoods.  
On the other hand, it argued that deteriorated neighborhoods could not be redeveloped 
cost effectively due to the lack of housing demand.  As Krumholz explained in a 1978 
interview, “In some of the neighborhoods in Cleveland—the blasted kinds of 
neighborhoods where everything has collapsed: public services, school system, police 
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force, and everything else—we are trying to encourage the city, through public services, 
to maintain at least the limit of the city’s own standards of health and safety.  We are not 
recommending major capital expenditures in those areas because we feel a lot of 
emptying-out has to happen before the land becomes ripe again, if it ever becomes 
ripe.”122  He also acknowledged that Cleveland’s fiscal crisis could prevent the city from 
realizing even its most basic commitment to maintain public services in deteriorated 
areas:  “For the city to extend just its own levels, its own codes of health and safety, 
would probably strain the ability of the city budget beyond its present capacity now.”123 
The clearest sign that the City Planning Commission sought to implement urban 
triage comes in Cleveland’s early CDBG applications.  While nominally submitted by 
another department, these documents were revised and approved by the City Planning 
Commission, which used its technical expertise as leverage to shape the drafting of the 
city’s neighborhood rehabilitation strategy.124 The documents clearly reflect a triage 
orientation.  The CDBG application for fiscal year 1975-1976 stated as its goal “the 
creation of a stable and healthy neighborhood environment” through programs that will 
“arrest deterioration in the target areas.”125  These programs—which included code 
enforcement and low-interest loans to homeowners—were targeted to neighborhoods 
with only minor blight.  The deteriorated Hough area would be excluded, as would other 
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areas of the city previously targeted for Urban Renewal and Model Cities projects.  By 
contrast, the CDBG application’s proposed demolition program would be citywide.126 
Cleveland’s “Housing Assistance Plan,” which accompanied the original and 
amended CDBG applications for fiscal year 1976-1977, also reflected a triage strategy 
through its eligibility criteria.  The stated intention of the plan’s proposed Neighborhood 
Housing Services Program, which would include concentrated code enforcement, public 
improvements, and low-interest loans to homeowners for housing rehabilitation, was to 
“preserve neighborhoods, which are basically sound, but are beginning to exhibit 
symptoms of decline.”127  Likewise, major housing rehabilitation under the Section 8 
program would be limited to structures that were located “in localities that demonstrate 
initial stages of neighborhood revitalization with strong community organization and 
support to enforce and ensure the long term viability of the rehabilitated structures.”128  
The plan also imposed strict locational criteria for new subsidized housing.  To be 
eligible for new construction, neighborhoods would need to have fewer than 5% 
substandard units, fewer than 20% low-income families, fewer than 5% assisted housing, 
and fewer than 10% minority population.129  These criteria were intended to increase 
neighborhood choice for low-income families by building public housing in middle class 
and suburban areas, but they also would have the effect of excluding deteriorated areas 
from one of the few sources of public development typically available to them. 
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Indirectly, the influence of triage can also be seen in the City Planning 
Commission’s push to reform the tax foreclosure system.  Inspired by the creation of 
Missouri’s Land Reutilization Authority in 1971, which enabled St. Louis to landbank 
foreclosed properties, the commission initiated a study of tax foreclosure in Cleveland.  
As an aid to its analysis, it partnered with the Cleveland Foundation to hire Anthony 
Downs’s Real Estate Research Corporation to categorize Cleveland’s residential 
neighborhoods using a modified version of his 5-stage scale.130  The resulting report 
identified two areas in Cleveland—East Hough and West Hough—as undergoing 
terminal decline, but, the report warned, “field research throughout the country suggests 
… that few neighborhoods improve significantly once they are well into Stage 3 and 
decline is clearly underway.”131  The study led to the passage of House Bill 1327 by the 
Ohio legislature.  The law created a land bank in Cleveland and a two-part tax foreclosure 
system: foreclosures of vacant properties were fast-tracked so that municipalities could 
quickly acquire and landbank them, but occupied properties were processed more slowly 
to give homeowners time to make late payments and hold on to their properties.132 
Despite the evidence that urban triage became policy in Cleveland, there is little 
evidence that urban triage attracted any public attention, positive or negative.  A search of 
Cleveland newspaper records from 1970 to 1980 revealed no stories related to these 
policies, and in interviews, neither Krumholz nor his successor as planning director, 
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Hunter Morrison, could recall any public opposition, or even awareness, of the 
commission’s triage philosophy during Krumholz’s reign.133 
That is likely due to the limited impact of the policies.  One behind-the-scenes 
instance of conflict over the triage policy—which concerned the grassroots effort to bring 
new housing to the deteriorated Hough area—illustrates the point.  In the late 1970s, the 
Hough Area Development Corporation (HADC), then led by Hunter Morrison, sought to 
build new, highly subsidized, single-family housing in the neighborhood as a symbol of 
revitalization.  As planning director, Krumholz opposed the project.134  The tax 
foreclosure study had concluded that land in the Hough area had “almost no market 
value” and its short-term reuse potential was “negligible.”135  Previous projects in the 
Hough area, including subsidized retail and industrial operations, had largely failed, and 
Krumholz thought there was little the city could do to revitalize the Hough area short of 
total redevelopment.136  But Krumholz’s opposition held little sway politically.  Despite 
his skepticism, the city council approved the project, and the opening of the housing 
project garnered considerable positive press as a symbol of the growing neighborhood 
movement.137  This story was indicative of urban triage in action.  Krumholz claims the 
ward-based council routinely overrode his targeting recommendations, approving any 
project that could garner the necessary financing, because council members saw their 
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responsibility as promoting development in their own districts regardless of the 






















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








Theoretically, the St. Louis and Cleveland cases reinforce the difficulty of 
analyzing urban triage due to the multiplicity of definitions assigned to the term.  These 
cases include at least three distinct formulations of “classic” urban triage: the St. Louis 
Development Program, the “Team Four Plan,” and the Cleveland Policy Planning 
Report.  All three formulations share the essential characteristics of “classic” urban 
triage—neighborhoods are divided into three classes based on perceived health, and 
“middle” neighborhoods are prioritized for physical investment—but they defy the broad-
brush characterizations of critics.  None of these proposals called for the withdrawal of 
essential services from deteriorated areas.  In fact, they called for the maintenance of 
essential services and increases in social aid.  The Cleveland Policy Planning Report, in 
particular, was explicitly egalitarian and redistributive in its aims, positioning urban 
triage as a complement to policies that would enable low-income residents to move to 
better neighborhoods.  The Cleveland case shows best that “classic” urban triage cannot 
simply be dismissed as equivalent to “planned shrinkage” or “benign neglect.”  At least 
in theory, urban triage can be justified with reference to both efficiency and equity. 
On the other hand, in practice, the term “urban triage” cannot be separated from 
the wealth of connotations it has acquired.  Opponents of the “Team Four Plan” freely 
equated urban triage to “benign neglect” and even “urban renewal,” using it is an epithet 
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for any urban policy that would benefit whites or the city as a whole at the expense of the 
black community—an outcome that was, in fact, likely given the distribution of 
abandonment in St. Louis relative to the distribution of whites and blacks.  Neutral 
observers also used “urban triage” loosely to describe related policies or outcomes.  In St. 
Louis, observers called the 1950s era code enforcement program an example of “urban 
triage” because it targeted enforcement to neighborhoods in slight decline, even though 
the city was simultaneously clearing and redeveloping large swathes of deteriorated land 
in contradiction to “classic” triage.  Likewise, St. Louis’s long-term commitment to 
redeveloping its central corridor has been called a strategy of “urban triage”—despite the 
absence of a formal policy dictating the outcome—because the North Side has languished 
at the same time.  These examples show that while “urban triage” can be assigned a 
specific definition, like the designation of Downs’s “classic” urban triage, the term is 
inherently loaded and ambiguous, and therefore unsuitable for academic use. 
 The cases also call into doubt the viability of urban triage as implemented.  While 
urban triage was clearly reflected in Cleveland’s CDBG applications, neither case 
suggests that urban triage was politically viable—at least in a ward-based political 
system, where elected officials have a strong incentive to fight any disinvestment in their 
wards.  In St. Louis, aldermen representing the North Side led the successful fight against 
the 1975 Comprehensive Plan.  In Cleveland, the evidence is less direct, but both 
Krumholz and Morrison cite the ward system as a source of resistance to targeting 
policies.139  Nor did the plans in either city enjoy strong support from mayors.  Richard 
Ward, a principal of the Team Four firm, doubts that the mayor of St. Louis had even 
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read “Technical Memorandum 6B” when its contents were leaked to the press.140  He was 
therefore only too willing to distance himself from it.  In Cleveland, Krumholz 
complained that elected officials refused to acknowledge the city’s decline, despite the 
plain evidence before them, because to do so would expose them to criticism, and so his 
recommendations to plan in response to decline were often ignored.141 
More broadly, urban triage ran counter to the spirit of the nascent neighborhood 
movement.  Residents of the North Side in St. Louis and the Hough area in Cleveland 
objected to the clearance-and-redevelopment schemes of urban renewal, fearing the 
displacement of their communities, but they objected equally to the notion that their 
neighborhoods were unsalvageable, doomed to gradual abandonment and dispersal.  
Groups like the Hough Area Development Corporation fought to restore the reputation of 
deteriorated areas and bring them back to health through a combination of grassroots self-
help and government investment, just as middle-class residents were beginning to do in 
historic neighborhoods in cities like New York and San Francisco.  In St. Louis, North 
Side residents found the “Team Four Plan” particularly objectionable because the black 
community would likely bear the brunt of an ostensibly neutral policy.  While the city 
might benefit as a whole from triage, North Side activists fought to protect their own 
neighborhoods and community, arguing that morally, investment should be distributed on 
the basis of need, not efficiency. 
 The difficulty of implementing urban triage calls into question whether it can still 
be justified on grounds of efficiency or equity in practice.  Many cities chose to shift 
funds in the 1970s toward neighborhood rehabilitation and conservation programs as 
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federal policy and urban conditions changed.  However, if cities like Cleveland and St. 
Louis, which openly announced triage strategies, were not clearly able to simultaneously 
restrict development in deteriorated neighborhoods, or provide increased aid or relocation 
assistance to residents in those areas, then it is difficult to distinguish their planning 
regimes from those of other cities.  The question of whether “classic” urban triage can be 
applied in whole is especially important for judging the policy’s justification in terms of 
equity.  If the equity trappings of the proposal—including increased social aid to needy 
areas—were blocked, but the moratorium on development in deteriorated areas persisted, 
then the argument for urban triage would rest on efficiency and market logic alone.  It 
may still be justifiable, but it would be difficult to argue that residents of deteriorated 




















This paper alone cannot settle the debate over the ethics or efficacy of urban 
triage—but it can inform it.  It argues that urban triage was distinct from policies of urban 
renewal or planned shrinkage and could be justified theoretically in terms of both 
efficiency and equity.  However, in practice, the difficulty of implementing urban triage 
appears to have prevented the realization of either goal.  On the basis of this evidence, 
urban triage should neither be dismissed as incompatible with equity nor embraced as 
necessary and effective.  Instead, these cases offer a starting point for debate, ensuring 
that references to the historical record of urban triage are accurate and that planners can 
weigh for themselves the merit of the cases and learn from this historical period, which so 
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